Reflexive, Symmetric and Transitive Scientific   Representations by Yaghmaie, Aboutorab
Reexive, Symmetric and Transitive
Scientic Representations
Aboutorab Yaghmaie
Iranian Institute of Philosophy
yaghmaie@irip.ir
Abstract
Theories of scientic representation, following Chakravartty's catego-
rization, are divided into two groups. Whereas cognitive-functional
views emphasize agents' intentions, informational theories stress the
objective relation between represented and representing. In the rst
part, a modied structuralist theory is introduced that takes into ac-
count agents' intentions. The second part is devoted to dismissing
a criticism against the structural account of representation on which
similarity as the backbone of representation raises serious problems,
since it has denite logical features, i.e. reexivity, symmetry and
transitivity, which representation lacks. Drawing on the representa-
tional relation between quantum and statistical eld theories, I argue
that scientic representation displays these logical features, although
depending on the context they may be used or not.
1. Scientic Representation and Its Theories
It seems that all philosophers of science, whether realist or anti-realist, agree
that successful scientic theories and models represent the world.1 By look-
ing at all kinds of representations, three elements can be recognized easily:
1.What represents, called the source of representation or briey the source,
2.what is represented or the target and, 3.the relation of representation es-
tablished between the source and the target. For instance, Watson-Crick
model of DNA, as a source, represents the molecular structure in cells as
1It is obvious that anti-realists restrict representation to the observable aspects of the
world.
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the target or billiard model of ideal gases represents the behaviour of atoms
in a gas. These models are known as iconic models. Besides these models,
there are more abstract ones that constitute or characterize scientic the-
ories.2 Take, for example, the theory of classical particle mechanics. This
theory is (characterized by) set-theoretic structures or models satisfying a
given set-theoretic predicate (McKinsey, Sugar, and Suppes 1953). Let's call
this group \theoretical" models.
But in virtue of what, these models are representational? To answer this
question, theories of scientic representation attempt to nd the necessary
and sucient conditions for representation, and complete the sentence:
\Source S represents target T i . . . "
Chakravartty (2010) has divided these theories into two groups: cognitive-
functional and informational. Cognitive-functional view holds scientic rep-
resentation as a cognitive tool helping an agent to infer, interpret, under-
stand, etc. some properties of a target. For instance, an architect may use
the properties of a bridge made of pasta to infer a real bridge's features. In
this view, there is no place for objective connection between a source and its
target; the relation in which only agents' intentions get involved. One may
express the cognitive-functional view as follows:
Cognitive-Functional Definition of Scientific Representation:
S represents T i a cognitive agent C, with regard to some properties of S, in-
tends to infer, interpret, understand etc. some properties of T, and achieves
them.
But on the other side, informational theorists envisage scientic representa-
tion in a completely dierent way. They accept that agents use representation
towards their cognitive aims, but those aims and intentions they argue, have
no constitutional role in representation. Besides, scientic representation is
a kind of similarity which is realized by structural relations e.g. isomorphism
(Van Fraassen 1980, Ch.3), homomorphism or partial isomorphism.3 Conse-
quently, a structuralist may ll the above bi-conditional as follows:
2In this article, we follow the non-linguistic, semantic or model-theoretic approach to
scientic theories. Scientic theories, according to this view, are constituted (Van Fraassen
1989, p.222) or characterized (da Costa and French 2003, p.34) by models. This view is in
contrast with the syntactic approach which adopts them as the collection of propositions.
3Although several philosophers have considered isomorphism too strong to be a rela-
tion inducing representation, and instead dealt with weaker structural relations such as
homomorphism (Bartels 2006) and partial isomorphism (da Costa and French 2003, Ch.3),
for simplicity and the sake of argument we take it as a paradigmatic structural relation
on which representation takes place.
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Structuralist Definition of Scientific Representation: S rep-
resents T i S and T are isomorphic.
We have S = S = hS; Ki and T = T = hT ; Li provided that S and T
are structures themselves, otherwise S and T are structures exemplied or
instantiated by S and T respectively. K and L are n-tuple relations dened
on sets S and T respectively. Now, structures S and T are isomorphic if
there is a bijective map f : S  ! T such that for (s1; : : : ; sn) 2 Sn and
(f(s1); : : : ; f(sn)) 2 T n, K(s1; : : : ; sn) ! L(f(s1); : : : ; f(sn)).
As we see in the structuralist denition, intentions apparently do not have
any job to do, that is in contrast to the cognitive-functional denition. There
are several arguments attempting to show that, even in the structuralist def-
inition, intentions get involved (Frigg 2006; Hendry and Psillos 2007; Muller
2011). The implicit role of language in the structuralist representations and
its relationship with intentionality are two assumptions which these argu-
ments are based on. In the following, a modied structuralist theory is in-
troduced which takes into account intentions although it does not deal with
the role of language.
The point is that structuralists are likely to accept that representation, even
objectively established, is a relation which scientists use to achieve cognitive
goals. If so, the clause \there just is a bijective map" is not enough to achieve
these goals. We should discover this map to use it. On the other hand, this
map may be not unique. For instance, consider two maps f and g through
which T is represented by S. Suppose further that with discovering f denite
properties of T can be inferred, interpreted etc. and with discovering g other
ones.4 It is intuitive to consider these representations as dierent ones. To
explain why distinct maps lead to dierent representations, an analogy with
the Tarskian form of linguistic representation may be helpful. Consider a
world with two brothers named Joe and Jim as objects and brotherhood as
a relation. In this world, Joe is Jim's brother and Jim is Joe's brother. Does
4It should be argued that this is possible. In the case of mathematical structures, there
are some cases in which dierent properties may be inferred via distinct isomorphisms
between two structures. For instance, consider the isomorphism between vector structure
V and its dual V . One possible isomorphism is f : V  ! V  such that 8vi 2 A and
8vj 2 B; f(vi) = vj where (vi:vj ) = ij . A and B are bases of V and V  respectively.
( : ) indicates inner product and ij Kronecker delta function. If we consider V
 as a
representation of V , it can be inferred that the basis of V is A. However, there are other
options for dening isomorphism. For example, suppose map g : V  ! V  such that
8ui 2 A and 8uj 2 B; g(ui) = uj such that (ui:uj ) = ij . This time, C and D are bases
of V and V  respectively and it can be inferred that the basis of V is C. Mathematicians
in these situations say isomorphism is not natural (Mac Lane and Brikho 1999, p.209).
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sentence \A is B's brother" represent this world linguistically? Yes, but in
two dierent ways. If A and B interpreted as Joe and Jim respectively, the
sentence represents Joe is Jim's brother, but if A and B interpreted as Jim
and Joe respectively, it represents this time Jim is Joe's brother. Therefore,
choosing dierent interpretations leads to distinct linguistic representations.
In the same manner, selecting out dierent maps leads to distinct scientic
representations. So there is a striking similarity between the way of looking
at scientic representation and the Tarskian form of linguistic representa-
tion. As in the Tarskian truth dierent interpretations change the identity
of truth, in the structuralist form of scientic representation dierent maps
alter the identity of representation. If so, not only the source and the target
but the bijective map constitutes representation. Having equipped with the
Tarskian truth as a triplet relation:
Tarskian Truth: Open sentence F (x1; : : : ; xn) is true in model M re-
garding interpretation I : x1 ! a1; : : : ; xn ! an, T (F; I;M), i there is a
satisfaction of F (a1; : : : ; an) in M, where a1; : : : ; an are objects of M.
we will have the following modied structuralist account of representation:
Modified Structuralist Theory of Scientific Representation:
S represents T regarding bijection map of xing f : S  ! T , i there is
tness K(s1; : : : ; sn) $ L(f(s1); : : : ; f(sn)), where S; T ; (s1; : : : ; sn); K and
L are dened as before.
Fixing and tness in scientic representation resemble interpretation and
satisfaction in linguistic representation respectively. Moreover, as truth in
Tarskian sense is (or may be dened as) a 3-tuple relation between sentence,
model and interpretation, our formulation of scientic representation is a 3-
tuple relation between source, target and xing map. Therefore, insofar as
the xing is indenite it is meaningless to ask whether S represents T or not.
It is easy to see how intentions get involved in the xing process. Depending
on the target's properties we intend to be inferred, interpreted or understood,
the appropriate xing function is discovered. Remember the linguistic rep-
resentation discussed above. In a similar vein, depending on our intentions
for inferring either Joe is Jim's brother or Jim is Joe's brother, dierent in-
terpretations are chosen.
Although Bartels (2006), in the structuralist camp, has acknowledged the
role of intentions, the place of intentions in my account diers from what he
has commented on. According to Bartels:
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For example, one can use a road map to correctly represent ones
way home, if one intentionally takes a certain red curve on the
map to stand for the highway which one has to pass etc. Since
the road map is endowed with the relevant structure, it entails a
potential representation of his or her way home that can be ex-
ploited by means of an intentional representational mechanism.
Thus, we shall claim that A being homomorphic to B is sucient
for A to be potentially represented by B, i.e. that the exten-
sions of the relations "to be homomorphic to" and "to represent
potentially" coincide. In order for B to be also a correct actual
representation of A, A has to be selected as the target of the rep-
resentation from the set of objects potentially represented by B
(i.e., from the content of B) by some representational mechanism
connecting A with B.5 (Bartels 2006, pp.11-12)
He adds that intentionality is one of the representational mechanisms through
which the transformation from potential to actual representations occurs.
But in the modied denition, intentions get involved even in the poten-
tial representation, since without considering the map associated with ho-
momorphism, which is tantamount to ignoring intentions (like the case of
isomorphism), homomorphism cannot take place. In other words, the map
associated with homomorphism seems to be an essential part of scientic
representation in the account of Bartels as well.
Before exploring the next section, a further point is worthy of note. With re-
spect to the logical properties, i.e. reexivity, symmetry and transitivity, the
modied denition is on a par with the rst structuralist denition. Since
S represents S with the identity xing map (reexivity), if S represents T
with xing map f , then T represents S with f 1 (symmetry), and nally
if S represents T with f , and T represents W with g, then S represents W
with xing map g  f (transitivity). These are the logical \odd" features
which are involved in the structuralist theories except homomorphism, and
structuralism has been criticized severely in virtue of having them. In the
next section, we will trace back these allegedly odd features to Goodman's
work on the philosophy of art.
2. Science in the Shadow of Art
Although the notion of representation in the literature of philosophy of sci-
ence is rather new, other areas of philosophy such as philosophy of mind,
5The rst emphasis in the quote is mine.
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language and art have been acquainted with thinking about it long ago. For
instance, Goodman criticizes the notion of artistic representation as resem-
blance in his seminal work on the philosophy of art named Languages of Art.
One of the main reasons he outlines to reject artistic representation in this
sense is three already mentioned logical features which resemblance possesses
and consequently representation should have, but artworks lack. Concerning
reexivity and symmetry, he writes:
Some of the faults [of representation as resemblance] are obvious
enough. An object resembles itself to the maximum degree but
rarely represents itself; resemblance, unlike representation, is re-
exive. Again, unlike representation, resemblance is symmetric:
B is as much like A as A is like B, but while a painting may
represent the Duke of Wellington, the Duke doesn't represent the
painting. Furthermore, in many cases neither one of a pair of very
like objects represents the other: none of the automobiles o an
assembly line is a picture of any of the rest; and a man is not
normally a representation of another man, even his twin brother.
Plainly, resemblance in any degree is no sucient condition for
representation (Goodman 1976, p.6)
For rejecting transitivity as a feature of artistic representation, he uses an
example. Goodman asks us to imagine two paintings. The rst is a realistic
picture painted in ordinary perspective and having normal color. The sec-
ond picture is just like the rst except that the perspective is reversed and
each color replaced by its complementary. The second picture is in struc-
tural similarity with the rst and the rst with reality. Therefore, regarding
the transitivity of similarity, the second should be similar with reality and
represent it pictorially. But our intuition suggests that the second does not
represent reality. As a result, Goodman argues that representation cannot
be reduced to resemblance or similarity.
Following Goodman's argument against artistic representation as resemblance,
philosophers of science have put forward their arguments against scientic
representation as structural similarity. For instance, Frigg argues:
The rst and simple reason why representation cannot be ex-
plained in terms of isomorphism is that the latter has the wrong
formal properties: isomorphism is symmetric and reexive while
representation is not.(Frigg 2006, p.54)
Or Suarez claims that:
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Representation in general is an essentially non-symmetric phe-
nomenon: a source is not represented by a target merely in virtue
of the fact that the source represents the target : : : Merely be-
cause an equation represents a phenomenon, the phenomenon
cannot be said to stand for the equation. Representation is also
non-transitive and non-reexive.(Suarez, 2003)
Suarez then argues that scientic representation is not identied with iso-
morphism. For it possesses logical properties, i.e. reexivity, symmetry and
transitivity, which scientic representation lacks. His reason for considering
representation without these features may be stated as follows. First of all,
he concludes that, following Goodman's arguments, a true theory of repre-
sentation in general does not imply the logical properties for representation.
Secondly, he considers scientic representation as a particular type of repre-
sentation in general. Therefore, a true theory of scientic representation does
not imply these logical properties, and consequently, scientic representation
is not identied with isomorphism. However, there are some points about
this argument.
Firstly, why does Suarez presuppose a general type of representation which
scientic and artistic representations belong to? The possibility of such gen-
eral type needs a further argument which he does not try to put forward.
Secondly, even if we suppose, for the sake of argument, the possibility of such
general type of representation, we are not justied in projecting the proper-
ties of a particular type, either scientic or artistic, to a general type. That
particular type of representation may have its own properties which repre-
sentation in general does not possess. However, Suarez, following Goodman,
gives some examples from pictorial representation, and after investigating
their properties (in particular this property that a true theory of representa-
tion does not imply reexivity, symmetry and transitivity), projects them to
representation in general. However, it seems that he is not justied in doing
that.
Thirdly, it seems that he misinterprets the material implication in the de-
nition of the logical properties. It is true that according to the structuralist
denitions, if S represents T then T represents S, but \then" has no any
sense tied in with in virtue of and because of.
This is what Suarez puts forward against the structuralist denitions regard-
ing the logical properties. However, I would like to take a further step and
strengthen what he wants to show. Besides the argument criticized above,
he apparently has some intuitions supporting this idea that a true theory of
scientic representation should not imply the logical features. On the one
hand, it seems that intuitions suggested by artistic representations which are
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non-reexive, non-symmetric and non-transitive strengthen his idea. How-
ever, this kind of intuitions has nothing to do with scientic representation
as long as the relation between scientic and artistic representations is un-
covered.
On the other hand, some examples from scientic representation also may
support his idea. For instance, Suarez holds representing a phenomenon by
an equation should not imply representing the equation by the phenomenon.
He probably keeps in his mind that scientists usually use scientic represen-
tation directionally; from scientic models, equations, diagrams, theories etc.
to the world. For example, scientists use equations to discover some facts
about phenomena, not vice versa.
But the problem here is that considering such scientic examples supports,
at most, the claim that \there are some genuine examples of scientic rep-
resentation wherein S represents T, but T does not represent S". But what
Suarez needs is the idea that \according to a true theory of scientic repre-
sentation it is not true that if S represents T, then T represents S". However,
our scientic examples do not support the latter.
Suarez himself accepts that there are some contexts in which the logical
properties, e.g. symmetry, obtain. If we take the former claim seriously,
we should accept that these examples and related contexts are exceptional
and to some extent bogus. However, in the next sections, I will try to show
that the representational relation between quantum eld theory (QFT)6 and
statistical eld theory (SFT), which can be regarded importantly from a sci-
entic point of view, realizes the logical features.
Before discussing the relation between SFT and QFT, scrutinizing the role
of context is worthy of note. Until now, we have found that the logical prop-
erties are realized in some contexts of scientic representation, and they are
not in others. The question is that how context inuences on the realiza-
tion of these properties. It seems to me that the role of context is tied in
with the function of representation not representation simpliciter. In other
words, whereas the function of representation possesses the logical properties
in some contexts, it does not in others.
For example, consider a scientist having an exact equation with the full order
of approximation. She uses this equation, as a source of representation, to
infer some facts about the behaviour of an object in the world. In this case,
the function of representation, i.e. inference from the equation to the world,
6In this article, QFT means the so-called conventional quantum eld theory which
physicists use in practice. Therefore, algebraic or axiomatic approaches to this theory are
excluded. There is a real battle between philosophers of science over which approaches
is appropriate for philosophical scrutinizing. To be familiar with the arguments of both
sides see, for example, Wallace (2006),(2011) and Fraser (2009),(2011).
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is non-symmetric. Now consider again a scientist having an equation com-
plete only to the third-order approximation. She uses this equation, up to
the third-order, to infer something about the behaviour of an object. How-
ever, she also may turn to the world to nd the behaviour of the equation in
higher-orders. So the function in this case is symmetric.
The dierence between the rst and the second contexts lies in the dierence
between the functions of representation. Whilst in the rst case inferring
some properties of the world is important, in the second case inferring the
behaviour of the equation is as important as inferring some properties of the
world. According to a structuralist, the representational relations in both
cases are symmetric, though its function is non-symmetric in the rst and
symmetric in the second.
Scientists usually make use of representation towards their cognitive goals,
and representation, because of that, goes hand in hand mainly with its func-
tions. Associating representation with its functions may lead us to mistak-
ing the properties of function for representation, and projecting wrongly the
properties of the former to the latter. For instance, although representation
simpliciter may be a symmetric and a non-directional relation, it is con-
ceivable that its function is non-symmetric and directional. If so, we may
subsequently think of representation as a non-symmetric and directional re-
lation that is not true.
But, if functions usually accompany a representation, how can we discrim-
inate the properties of representation simpliciter? It seems that one way
is considering dierent scenarios or contexts in which functions' properties
depart from the properties of representation. We suspect there are contexts
in which we can easily do it. For instance, outlining the representational
relation between QFT and STF shows that non-reexivity, non-symmetry
and non-transitivity are not essential properties of scientic representation
and possibly just pertain to its functions.
It seems to me that outlining such scenarios weaken the idea that scientic
representation does not have the logical properties. Nevertheless, as a pos-
sible response, a proponent of cognitive-functional view might say that it is
possible to dene concepts, including scientic representation, in terms of
their functions. If so, functions of representation constitute representation
and outlining such scenarios is deemed to fail, since dening functionally
leads to the identity of representation's with function's properties. There-
fore, the departures appealed by a structuralist would not happen at all. The
point is that, however, taking functions of representation as its constituent
is what she should show and to do that, the identity cannot be presupposed.
In other words, she is not justied in objecting the structuralist denitions
by invalidating such scenarios. She needs a further argument in which func-
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tional denition of scientic representation is not presupposed.
A theory of representation should be such that those logical features can be
realized. In the next sections, we will see that QFT and SFT represent each
other in accordance with the structuralist denitions and represent each other
structurally. Moreover, there is a representational relation between them in
scientic sense, i.e. by having one theory we can interpret, infer, understand
etc. some properties of the other one. We will show that this notion of rep-
resentation between QFT and SFT, which we call representation in scientic
sense, is reexive, symmetric and transitive. If this evidence is conclusive
and the logical features are not so odd, the structuralist denitions cannot
be criticized due to having them, since there is a genuine example of repre-
sentation in scientic sense in which these logical features are realized.
3. QFT and SFT Represent each other Struc-
turally
We now discuss the relation between QFT and SFT. When philosophers of
science talk about scientic representation, they often bear in mind that the
world and its properties can be represented by scientic theories and models.
In other words, this relation is essentially established between scientic the-
ories and models on the one side and the world on the other side. Scientic
representation may be established, however, between theories themselves.
There are several cases in the history of science wherein scientists employ
a theory or model to understand, interpret, infer etc. some properties of
another theory or model. This has led to a more precise representation and
modeling of the world.
Let us focus on the relation between QFT and SFT in which source and
target are theories themselves. Physicists use one of them to represent an-
other one. Should we expand the domain of targets to scientic theories and
models, some new features of representation would be revealed, e.g. the de-
parture of representation's from functions' properties.
Before examining the relation between QFT and SFT, some words are in
order to give a brief account of each theory. SFT is a phenomenological the-
ory which regardless of microscopic properties of systems, either quantum
mechanical or classical, aims to describe their statistical and thermodynamic
behaviours. As the title of statistical eld theory suggests, two elements play
the key roles in this theory: 1.Field-theoretic physical magnitudes, i.e. the
physical magnitudes with innite degrees of freedom which their values do
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not depend on the microscopic structure of the system, 2.statistics which may
be classical or quantum mechanical. This theory deals with several questions,
e.g. what phase matter is in, in what temperatures phase transitions occur,
how correlation length changes in dierent temperatures and other questions
concerning the thermodynamic and statistical features of physical systems.
QFT deals with various topics from elementary particles decay to describing
superconductivity. This theory has at least two ingredients: 1.Field-theoretic
physical magnitudes7 and 2.eld quantizations.8 In this article, we will only
be concerned with the main aspects of these theories and their details will
not be scrutinized.
There are two ways to see the representational relation between QFT and
SFT. The rst one is showing that they are structurally similar and then
represent each other structurally. However, one may object that structural
representation is not concerned with the scientic or pre-philosophical sense
of representation which is connected to interpretation, understanding, infer-
ring, etc. Elucidating these latter relations between QFT and SFT without
discussing about the structuralist denitions is the second way, which will
of course not satisfy a structuralist. To overcome these two problems, we
will show that QFT and SFT represent each other in two ways, i.e. they
represent each other both structurally and scientically.
To show the structural similarity between QFT and SFT, the rst step is
to express statistical properties of a physical system eld-theoretically. Ar-
ticulating QFT in path integral formulation is the second one.9 Consider a
lattice system possessing physical magnitude s with value si in the i
th site
of lattice. s may either be scalar or vector. For simplicity we take it to be
7This is in contrast with the particle theories which attribute physical magnitudes with
nite degrees of freedom to particles. However, it is challenging that whether QFT should
be considered as a foundationally particle or eld theory. Our discussions and results here
are, however, independent of how this question answered.
8This question that what is quantum eld theory is challenging itself. For example
Fraser (2009) has argued that quantum eld theory is by denition a theory that best
unies quantum theory and the special theory of relativity. But this denition excludes
the quantum eld theory used in condensed matter physics, since being eld-theoretic is
more important than obeying special relativity in this physics.
9For details of SFT see (Mussardo 2010; Yeomans 1992), regarding path integral for-
mulation of QFT see (Peskin and Schroeder 1995, Chap.9-13; Greiner and Reinhardt 1996,
Chap.11-12). Regarding the relation between SFT and QFT see (Bellac 1991; Zinn-Justin
2002). Second quantization is another but rather old formulation of QFT which is not
pursued in this article. Path integral formulation have some advantages over second quan-
tization, e.g. the former is independent of employing perturbative or non-perturbetive
methods, but the latter is dependent on perturbetive ones, or the renormalization group
methods are applicable in QFT provided that the theory is best formulated via path
integrals.
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scalar. Changing s in each site leads to dierent system congurations with
denite probabilities given by the Gibbs distribution. For conguration fsig
we have the probability:
Pfsig =
1
Z
e Efsig (1)
where Efsig is the energy of conguration fsig.  is dened as 1KBT which
KB and T are Boltzmann's constant and temperature respectively. The
normalizing factor or partition function Z is:
Z =
X
i=1
e Efsig (2)
If we consider s as a eld-theoretic physical magnitude, i.e. a variable that
is dened on continuum x rather discrete parameter i, we deal with eld 
instead of s and write the Gibbs distribution as:
Pfg =
1
Z
e Sfg (3)
S is the action of the theory, given by an integral on a Lagrangian density.
This time eld-theoretic partition function is:
Z =
Z
D e Sfg (4)
which D can be dened:
D =
Y
0jkj 1
a
d(k) (5)
a is the lattice spacing and k eld wavevector. Requirement 0  jkj  1
a
is imposed to ensure integral (4) to be well dened. Lattice spacing a acts
as an ultraviolet cut-o that permits us to control ultraviolet divergences.
In other words, it tells us that eld  is well-dened only around lengths
greater than a. There is no guarantee when a ! 0 the eld remains to be
well-dened. Physicists use cut-o to control ultraviolet divergences not only
in SFT but in QFT as well. This interpretation of cut-o quantity in SFT,
that every eld is well-dened provided that the momentum or wavenumber
is smaller than a given cut-o, can be applied in QFT and makes sense the
appearance of divergences in this theory. By considering cut-o in this way,
we interpret QFT via SFT or, philosophically, QFT is represented by SFT.
We will return back to this issue in the next section.10
10Of course, cuto is a method for removing unphysical divergences in QFT, it is \regu-
larization" method. There are other regularization methods which essentially do the same
job. Perhaps, cuto is the one with more physical interpretation.
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By changing temperature, eld value in each point of the continuum changes
and accordingly thermal averaging or correlation function as observables of
SFT will be:
< (x1)(x2) : : : (xn) >=
1
Z
Z
D(x1)(x2) : : : (xn)e Sfg (6)
It can be shown that if we couple  with external eld J , the correlation
function is:
< (x1)(x2) : : : (xn) >=
1
Z[0]
nZ[J ]
J(x1)J(x2) : : : J(xn)
jJ=0 (7)
Where Z[J ] is the partition function with external eld J and Z[0] with
J = 0. This is the rst step in SFT. We should now present QFT such that
its structural similarity with SFT is made apparent.
Although quantum and statistical elds are completely dierent physical
objects11, similar relations with (3)-(6) might be explored about quantum
elds. Consider quantum eld  (x). The probability amplitude for transition
from  (x) to  (x0) conguration is given by generating functional :
W =
Z
D eiSf g (8)
S, like the action of statistical eld, is given by the Lagrangian density of
quantum eld. Not only from denitional point of view Z and W are simi-
lar, but also they play similar roles in constructing observables of their own
theories. For instance, the correlation function in QFT as an observable is
given by:
<  (x1) (x2) : : :  (xn) >=
1
W
Z
D  (x1) (x2) : : :  (xn)eiSf g (9)
If the eld coupled with external eld J , it can be shown that:
<  (x1) (x2) : : :  (xn) >=
1
W [0]
( i)n 
nW [J ]
J(x1)J(x2) : : : J(xn)
jJ=0 (10)
To show that relations (11) with (5) and (12) with (6) are structurally similar,
the nal step should be taken that is establishing a xing map relating them
to each other. In fact, the Wick rotation is the xing map we are seeking
for. If the statistical eld is dened on a 4-dimensional Euclidean space
11For instance, quantum, elds uctuate due to quantum uctuations and statistical
elds as a result of thermal ones.
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E = f(xE1 ; xE2 ; xE3 ; xE4)g and quantum eld on a 4-dimensional Minkowski
space M = f(x0; x1; x2; x3)g, the Wick rotation as a xing map facilitates
the transition from SFT to QFT:
f : E  ! M
f(xE) = f(xE1 ; xE2 ; xE3 ; xE4) = ( ixE4 ; xE1 ; xE2 ; xE2) = (x0; x1; x2; x3)
(11)
and from QFT to SFF transition:
f 1 : M  ! E
f 1(x) = f 1(x0; x1; x2; x3) = (x1; x2; x3; ix0) = (xE1 ; xE2 ; xE3 ; xE4)
(12)
These xing maps provide the translations from one theory to another or
structural similarity between them.12 Relations (4), (6) and (7) in SFT play
the same roles which (10), (11) and (12) do in QFT respectively.
Concerning the structural similarity between QFT and SFT, there are some
important remarks to be made. First of all, this similarity is partial, i.e. it
does not hold for all domains of the theories. For instance, although thermal
uctuations in SFT can be switched o in principle, quantum uctuations in
QFT, even in principle, cannot. In other words, isomorphism between QFT
and SFT is just partial.13 This article does not deal with this partiality and
concerns only with the validity of structural representation, regardless of its
totality or partiality.
Secondly, the Wick rotation or the xing map is not established, at least
prima facie, for showing the structural similarity between SFT and QFT.
Physicists use the Wick rotation to be sure about the convergence of cor-
relations functions and subsequently to compute them.14 Along with, the
structural similarity is discovered. Therefore, as the case in which target is
the world and xing map has a heuristic nature that should be discovered,
in our case wherein the target is a theory, it should be discovered as well.
Thirdly, establishing and uncovering the structural similarity provided by
the Wick rotation is not just a mathematical game and has a physical signif-
icance:
12In fact, there is a further structural similarity, maybe more importantly, between these
two theories based on the space or manifold constructed by the coupling constants rather
Euclidean or Minkowski spaces. The dynamics of this new space is represented by the
renormalization group ow which is indeed a dynamics through energy scales. The author
is preparing an independent paper on the structural similarity between SFT and QFT due
to the renormalization group methods.
13For the denition of partial isomorphism and a structuralist theory of scientic rep-
resentation in terms of partial isomorphism see (Bueno and French 2011).
14For its details see (Greiner and Reinhardt 1996, pp.371-375).
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In essence, it [the structural similarity between QFT and SFT]
adds to our reserves of knowledge a completely new source of in-
tuition about how eld theory expectation values should behave.
This intuition will be useful in imaging the general properties of
loop diagrams and it will give important insights will help us cor-
rectly understand the role of ultraviolet divergences in [quantum]
eld theory calculations. (Peskin and Schroeder 1995, p.296)
As we see, there is a representational relation between QFT and SFT ac-
cording to the structuralist denitions. What we should do in the following
is showing that they represent each other according to what a proponent of
cognitive-functional view keeps in mind. The next section is devoted to this
issue.
4. QFT and SFT Represent each other Sci-
entically
In this section, we will employ superconductivity to show that QFT may
be used for interpreting a statistical eld theory, i.e. the Ginzburg-Landau
eld theory of superconductivity. Moreover, we will mention using SFT to
interpret renormalization method in QFT, although its details will not be
spelled out here.15 If this evidence is conclusive, it can be concluded that
the representational relation between SFT and QFT is not restricted to the
structural sense and covers the meaning which scientists bear in mind.
Meissner-Ochsenfeld eect is a phenomenon in which second-order phase
transition from normal conductivity to superconductivity occurs.16 There
are several theories, from classical London theory (1935) to quantum eld-
theoretic account of Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieer (BCS) (1957), aim to ex-
plain this phenomenon. Among these theories, the Ginzburg-Landau model
(1950) has a middle situation, since it is a phenomenological theory which
can be interpreted microscopically.17 To see how this model works, consider
15David Wallace (2011) has recently discussed about it.
16To become familiar with this eect briey, consider a sample of material which is held
at temperature T > TC and placed in a small magnetic eld. In this case, the magnetic
eld will easily penetrate into the sample. But if we cool the sample to below TC , the
magnetic eld is expelled. Dierent materials have their own critical temperature TC at
which the phase transition occurs. For details see (Annet 2004).
17The application of the Ginzburg-Landau theory is beyond describing superconductiv-
ity and used in particle physics such as Higgs mechanism.
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its free energy:
FLG[	(r)] =
Z
dr(
~2
2m
j (~
i
r+q !A )	(r) j2 +a j 	(r) j2 + b
2
j 	(r) j4) (13)
where
 !
A is the electromagnetic vector potential and, a and b are parameters
to be determined. Field 	 is the order parameter which is continuous at
the critical point TC and determines the nature of the second-order phase
transition. The order parameter is zero at T > TC and non-zero at T < TC .
Like other models of SFT, the probability of conguration f	g is:
Pf	g =
1
ZLG
e FLGf	g (14)
and its partition function:
ZLG =
Z
D	D	 e FLGf	g (15)
Given the partition function, other physical properties such as internal en-
ergy and specic heat of a superconductor near critical temperature are
known. For instance, it will be known that the specic heat is divergent
at T = TC . What is important in the Ginzburg-Landau model and makes it
a phenomenological model in nature is that it is unknown what microscopic
properties 	, m and q refer to. Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieer developed
the rst microscopic theory of superconductivity in 1957 and two years later
in 1959, Gor'kov (1959) could derive the Ginzburg-Landau model from BCS
eld theory and more importantly, he could interpret those terms in the
Ginzburg-Landau eld theory which their interpretations were unknown un-
til that time:
It is shown that the phenomenological Ginzburg-Landau equa-
tions follow from the theory of superconductivity [BCS] in the
London temperature region in the neighborhood of Tc. In these
equations there occurs, however, twice the electronic charge; this
is related to the physical meaning of 	(x) as the wave function
for Cooper pairs. (Gor'kov 1959, p.1364)
Thanks to the Gor'kov's paper, it is known that 	(x) is the wave function
of Cooper pairs, q its charge and m its eective mass. Concerning this
achievement, one proponent of cognitive-functional view is likely to accept
that the BCS theory is used to interpret and consequently represent the
16
Ginzburg-Landau model. Strictly speaking, a quantum eld theory repre-
sents a statistical eld theory.18
The contribution of SFT in understanding QFT may be more than what
QFT gives us to understand SFT. It is now a established fact that renormal-
ization of elds and parameters provides a consistent set-up to deal with the
divergences which appear once one uses standard eld theory computational
tools; renormalization of parameters is a well tested prediction of QFT and
perhaps one of its biggset triumphs.19
Renormalization group methods in QFT, which initially developed from the
statistical eld-theoretic methods in condensed matter physics by Wilson and
Kogut in the early 1970s (Wilson and Kogut 1974; Wilson 1975), produced
an explanatory framework which has been very fruitful for QFT. Although
discussing this topic in detail is beyond the goal of this paper and needs to
be tackled in an independent paper, we will mention it briey.20
According to the renormalization group based interpretation of QFT, it is a
large-scale theory which breaks down at some short lengthscales. This lat-
ter in turn gives rise to the ultraviolet divergences. Before employing the
renormalization group methods, physicists got rid of innities by a tricky
mathematical method which had no physical interpretation. Roughly speak-
ing, they imposed cut-os in the integrals associated with scattering ampli-
tudes to immune physical magnitudes from divergences. As Wallace (2011)
has argued, imposing cut-o becomes meaningful due to the renormalization
group. According to this method, cut-o expresses the bound of applicabil-
ity of QFT or the range of spacetime in which QFT is dened. Therefore,
as employing SFT in condensed matter physics in the ranges smaller than
the lattice spacing gives rise to divergences, using QFT in arbitarily short
lengthscales results in the ultraviolet divergences. In the case of SFT, we
have theories such as non-relativistic quantum mechanics which works well
in the ranges smaller than the lattice spacing. For QFT, however, we have
not yet had a well-established theory for some short lenghtscales. In sum,
for interpreting QFT, or philosophically for representing QFT, SFT is used
as the source of representation.
18Although BCS developed their theory in terms of second quantization method of QFT,
it might be presented according to the path-integral method as well (Fletcher 1990).
19There are still some misconceptions about this point. For instance, Fraser (2006;
2011) has argued against the conventional quantum eld theory because the existence of
innities which this theory is confronted with. Her alternative is the algebraic or axiomatic
quantum eld theory.
20Wallace (2011) has argued that employing the renormalization group methods in QFT
provides a physical explanation for removal of innities, though Huggett (2002) introduced
these methods earlier.
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In sections 3 and 4, we tried to show that SFT and QFT represent each
other not only structurally, but also according to the scientic sense which
some proponents of cognitive-functional view may favour. Consequently, the
representational relation between QFT and SFT is symmetric from both
philosophical and scientic points of views.
The structuralist account of scientic representation sets the scene such that
the symmetry of scientic representation is realized. The symmetry of repre-
sentation in scientic area, possibly in contrast to the artistic representation,
is not a strange or odd feature. It has, on the contrary, a central importance
among the properties of scientic representation, in particular regarding the
relation between QFT and SFT.
5. Scientic Representation with Other \Pe-
culiar" Features
Until now, it has been shown that the symmetry may play a key role in sci-
entic representation. In this section, I concern with two other apparently
\odd" features of scientic representation, i.e. reexivity and transitivity.
First, reexivity. As mentioned earlier, it is usually claimed that a scientic
theory or model cannot represent itself. In other words, the source and the
target of representation cannot be identical. According to the structuralist
denitions, however, there are four elements involved in representation which
their identity should be explored: S; T;S and T. Therefore, if we consider
the identity between these four elements, the identities may be realized in
three ways. In the rst case, in which S with T and S with T are identi-
cal, we get full representation. Although there is a genuine representation in
this way, we don't use it. Since if we have the source and its instantiated
structure we know everything about its target, i.e. itself and the associated
structure.
In the second case, S and T are identical butS and T are not. For instance, in
the case of representation about superconductors discussed above, the same
sample of material instantiates two dierent structures, i.e. one structure
described by SFT and another one by QFT. Therefore, it is conceivable that
one takes a sample with the structure associated with the BCS theory, and
represents it with the structure described by the Ginzburg-Landau model.
Thus, in this case of identity also, there is no problem with the reexivity.
In the nal case, the source and the target are dierent, but their related
structures are identical. There are genuine examples of scientic represen-
tation which belong to this category. To take a concrete example, consider
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ferromagnetic and anti-ferromagnet materials which both can be modelled
by the Ising model.21 In this model, the lattice may be assumed to be cubic,
and spin number associated with each site of the lattice is either 1 or  1.
The system's Hamiltonian would be:
H =
1
2
X
ij
Jijsisj  B
X
i
si (16)
where B is an externally imposed eld. Jij is constant J if i and j are
neighbouring sites and zero otherwise. The partition function can be written:
ZIsing =
X
fsig
e[(B
P
i si  12
P
ij Jijsisj)] (17)
where fsig indicates that the sum is on all congurations obtained by assign-
ing 1 or  1 to the sites. With regard to describing both ferromagnetic and
anti-ferromagnetic materials by this model, one can utilize thermodynamic
properties of a ferromagnetic to infer the properties of an anti-ferromagnetic,
and vice versa. For instance, it can be shown that their internal energies are
equal. Consequently, reexive representation in the third category, as well,
is not irrelevant and includes some genuine examples of scientic representa-
tion.
The only apparently \odd" logical feature left to discuss is transitivity. Con-
sider the last case of representation between ferromagnetic and anti-ferromagnetic
materials. These materials are modelled not only by a common structure de-
scribed above, but also by their own structures as well. These models are
determined by assigning the value of J . The structures associated with a
ferromagnetic and an anti-ferromagnetic are the ones with J = c < 0 and
J = c0 > 0 respectively. We denote them by S and T.
On the one hand, they are isomorphic and then represent each other. On
the other hand, structure T represents the properties of anti-ferromagnetic
materials denoted by W . Up to now, we know S represents T and T repre-
sents W . But as stated earlier, we can use the structure associated with the
ferromagnetic materials, S, to represent the behaviour of anti-ferromagnetic
materials, i.e. W . Therefore, the conditional if S represents T and T repre-
sents W , then S represents W is satised. So the transitivity also obtains.
21For details see (Binney et al. 1992).
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Conclusion
After reviewing theories of scientic representation briey, a modied struc-
turalist denition of scientic representation has been introduced that takes
into account agents' intentions. In the second part, some examples from SFT
and QFT highlighted that reexivity, symmetry and transitivity have central
importance in scientic representation, and because of that, should be taken
seriously. My arguments support this claim that scientic representation dis-
plays these logical features, although depending on the scientic context we
may use them or not. The structuralist theories of scientic representation
has this advantage that sets the scene such that these logical properties are
possible to be realized.
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